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Abstract: Neural and behavioral evidence from diverse species indicates that some forms of pain 
may be generated by coordinated activity in networks far smaller than the cortical pain matrix in 
mammals. Studies on responses to injury in squid suggest that simplification of the circuitry 
necessary for conscious pain might be achieved by restricting awareness to very limited 
information about a noxious event, possibly only to the fact that injury has occurred, ignoring 
information that is much less important for survival, such as the location of the injury. Some of 
the neural properties proposed to be critical for conscious pain in mammals are also found in the 
nervous systems of numerous species, including invertebrates. These considerations suggest that 




Edgar T. Walters Edgar.T.Walters@uth.tmc.edu is Professor of 
Integrative Biology and Pharmacology and holder of the 
Fondren Chair in Cellular Signaling at the University of Texas 
Medical School at Houston. His research has focused on long-
term alterations of neural and behavioral responses to 
peripheral injury in molluscs (Aplysia and squid), on 
mechanisms of chronic pain induced by spinal cord injury in 




Arguments about which species can and cannot feel pain are often based on behavioral 
observations and philosophical assumptions. In contrast, Key (2016) argues that fish (and by 
implication many other animals) do not feel pain because they lack neural substrates equivalent 
to the cortical pain matrix in mammals. There is now overwhelming evidence that neocortical 
processing is important for human pain experience, as reviewed by Key, and that cortical 
processing makes major contributions to pain-related behavior in rodent preclinical models (e.g., 
Barthas et al., 2015; Koga et al., 2015). Key asserts that pain is experienced in the cerebral 
cortex and, following influential theories about mechanisms of consciousness, he proposes that 
long-range binding of gamma oscillations across the cortical pain matrix is a core mechanism for 
the conscious experience of pain. Key acknowledges that it is not known how synchronized 
rhythmic activity of widespread populations of neurons actually generates a feeling such as pain, 
but he is confident that neural network properties essential for these cortical oscillations are 
required. The two properties he considers most important are signal amplification and global 
integration, which, Key asserts, are lacking in the nociceptive networks of fish.  
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Key’s rejoinder to several criticisms of this thesis is to note that the critics fail to provide 
mechanistic alternatives to cortical processing for generating conscious pain in fish. I will argue 
that fish, like many other “lower” animals, possess neural networks with properties equivalent 
to many of those posited by Key as essential for the conscious experience of pain. Let me begin 
by agreeing with Key that fish do not experience pain in the same way that humans do. Pain 
scientists have demonstrated that human pain comes in countless varieties and is highly 
dependent upon a person’s past experience, current context, and expectations of the future. In 
fish, information processing, including nociceptive information processing, is undoubtedly much 
more limited than in humans — a difference predicted by the much smaller brains and 
restricted behavioral repertoires of fish. On the other hand, Key’s claim is that fish do not feel 
pain, not that fish do not feel human pain. The central question is whether fish lack the capacity 
for conscious experience of any kind of pain. 
 
Most pain scientists accept the definition of the International Association for the Study of Pain 
that pain is “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage….” By this definition, pain requires conscious, unpleasant awareness of 
actual or potential injury (noxious stimulation), but pain does not require awareness of the 
many features typically associated with human pain, including the location, duration, and 
severity of noxious stimulation, or closely associated feelings (anxiety, depression) linked to 
experience with injury and expectations about its consequences. The neocortical features Key 
deems important for pain are specializations that evolved for highly efficient processing of 
enormous amounts of information by cognitively advanced mammals, and which certainly 
facilitate cognitive integration and representation of the numerous properties he lists for human 
pain (“attention, discrimination, localization, duration, intensity, unpleasantness, valence, and 
motivational value”). However, conscious awareness of noxious stimulation can, in principle, be 
mediated by much simpler neural networks than the mammalian cortical pain matrix if much 
less information is involved (simpler network inputs) and if less flexibility is needed in generating 
adaptive behavioral responses (simpler network outputs).  
 
Simpler forms of consciousness would correspond to the “raw experience” or “primitive feelings” 
dismissed by Key because of his assumption that fish lack an adequate neural substrate for any 
kind of consciousness. However, it is plausible that consciousness of only the valence of an 
animal’s physiological state could be biologically useful, and this type of passive awareness 
should require much less neural computational power than the types of active, information-rich 
awareness familiar to humans. Evidence for how little information might be sufficient for 
nociceptive awareness comes from another free-swimming aquatic organism, the squid, which 
has a lifestyle remarkably similar to fish. Squid exhibit striking sensitization of defensive 
responses following injury to an arm or fin (Crook et al., 2011), and this nociceptive sensitization 
has been shown to enhance the survival of the injured animals (Crook et al., 2014). As in 
mammals, this behavioral sensitization is paralleled by enhanced sensitivity and activity in 
sensory neurons that encode noxious stimuli (nociceptors). Surprisingly, and quite unlike 
mammals, the long-lasting hyperactivity of squid nociceptors after focal injury is not restricted 
to those innervating an injured fin. Instead, hyperactivity is quite general, occurring in 
nociceptors on both sides of the body (Crook et al., 2013). This suggests that the location on the 
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body of an injury is relatively unimportant to squid, which like fish (and unlike mammals) have 
little or no ability to tend to a wound or selectively protect it.  
 
On the other hand, the simple fact that a squid has received a significant injury (one potentially 
noticeable to a predator) is extremely important, resulting in a major change in behavioral state 
that has significant costs and benefits. An intriguing question is whether the spontaneous 
activity in widespread squid nociceptors resulting from focal injury has a role like Key’s cortical 
“signal amplification” in driving a neural network that allows a squid to be conscious of the 
valence of its physiological state; that is, that it has been injured. In this case, the signal 
amplification would be generated by a generalized activation of peripheral nociceptors, rather 
than recurrent excitation within a specialized central network, but it might have a similar 
outcome in driving coherent network activity from which some kind of awareness emerges. In 
both squid and fish, simple awareness of the fact of an injury sufficiently severe to attract 
predatory interest may be far more important for minimizing further risk than conscious 
attention to details of the injury. Awareness of no more than the valence of the altered bodily 
state (the aversiveness of injury) would make this a form of pain.  
 
On a related note, Key suggests that a lack of apparent effects on normal behavior (feeding, 
swimming, mating) of fish after injuries such as crude craniotomy indicate an absence of pain. In 
free-swimming organisms that lack safe refuges, individuals that fail to disguise their 
compromised condition are magnets for attacks by predators or conspecifics. Alteration of overt 
behavior is easily detected, especially in shoaling organisms, so aquatic animals that cannot hide 
are under strong selection pressures to continue their activities as normally as possible after 
injury. This does not mean that their internal state is unchanged, or that they are not in some 
sense aware of their more vulnerable condition. Except for the initial escape behavior during 
injury, human observers saw no difference in the overt behavior of injured and uninjured squid 
after experimental injury to an arm. The resulting hypervigilant state was recognized only when 
a predator approached, which evoked much earlier and stronger defensive responses (Crook et 
al., 2014).  
 
Defensive motivational states triggered by noxious stimulation, which may or may not affect 
spontaneous behavior, probably occur in many animals. For example, after Aplysia (large, slug-
like marine snails) received a neutral chemical stimulus paired with strong noxious stimulation, 
they later displayed no obvious response to the chemical stimulus alone. However, when test 
stimuli that elicit defensive or appetitive responses were then applied in the presence of the 
chemical stimulus, the Aplysia showed dramatic enhancement of various defensive responses 
and suppression of feeding behavior (Walters et al., 1981). In mammals, such conditioned 
motivational states resulting from noxious experience are felt as learned fear. This and various 
other reports — some from other commentators in this issue — indicate that complex 
motivational states are linked to noxious experience in “lower” animals.  
 
The widespread occurrence of such states raises interesting questions about the species and 
types of neural organization that are most likely to manifest some kind of conscious awareness 
in pain-like and fear-like states. Behavioral tests of the aversiveness of internal states produced 
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by noxious stimulation will be particularly important for addressing these questions. Powerful 
operant methods, notably conditioned place preference and conditioned place aversion tests, 
are available but have rarely been used in studies of pain-like states in non-mammalian 
vertebrates or in invertebrates. Indeed, these useful tests are quite uncommon in the very large 
field of preclinical pain research in mammals, which has largely relied on simple reflexive 
measures that fail to capture the aversive component of pain. With rare exceptions (e.g., 
Barthas et al., 2015), preclinical studies of the cortical pain matrix have depended upon these 
limited reflexive indicators of pain. 
 
What neural substrates could mediate simple consciousness of noxious stimulation? As with any 
form of consciousness, we can only speculate, but it is interesting to use Key’s functional 
arguments as a starting point. Key considers signal amplification and global integration 
important because he assumes along with various theorists that consciousness somehow 
emerges from the coordinated activity of large numbers of neurons. In humans, signal 
amplification leads to widespread neural activity, while global integration helps the extended 
network synchronize, shape, and sustain this activity. As argued above, simple consciousness of 
injury should require substantially fewer neurons than the information-rich consciousness 
possible in mammalian brains. Do mechanisms exist in simpler nervous systems that enable the 
coordinated activity of a substantial fraction of neurons following noxious stimulation?  
 
Basic mechanisms of neural network activation and integration are highly conserved, and those 
mentioned by Key as important for conscious pain (extensive, synchronous activation of 
relevant neuronal populations, local inhibitory circuits, reciprocal excitatory and inhibitory 
interconnections among these neuronal populations) have been found in nearly all nervous 
systems that have been examined neurophysiologically, including invertebrate nervous systems. 
Detection of bodily injury and the adaptive generation and integration of overt as well as 
internal state responses to injury have a very high biological priority in most animals (Walters, 
1994), so it seems likely in these species that many neurons will be activated concurrently 
during significant noxious stimulation.  
 
The number of neurons intensely and coordinately activated during noxious stimulation may be 
relatively large even in simple brains. For example, optical imaging of the largest aggregation of 
neurons in Aplysia (found in each pedal ganglion) revealed that virtually all of the recordable 
neurons showed long-lasting responses to stimulation of a peripheral nerve at an intensity that 
activated nociceptors (Bruno et al., 2015). While the recorded population included motor 
neurons, and the authors interpreted their results in terms of motor program generation, most 
of the pedal ganglion neurons had unknown functions. Regardless of how many of the recorded 
neurons contributed to nociceptive information processing, this example of massively 
synchronized, complex activity triggered by noxious stimulation illustrates the potential of 
relatively simple nervous systems to generate patterns of activity that in some species might be 
linked to simple forms of pain.  
 
The logical possibility that coordinated activity of perhaps hundreds or thousands of neurons 
(rather than many millions) may produce an aversive awareness of noxious stimulation 
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reinforces the opinion that fish, amphibians, reptiles, and some invertebrates may experience 
forms of conscious pain. Nonetheless, we still know very little about when and why during 
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